AR 158
Revised Oct 80

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

FILE No 8

17	26	AIR	1

Part No

Headquarters
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

NOTE: This cover is to be used only for official file series recorded with Australian Archives. Form Number AR 111 is to be used

SUBJECT: EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER

Folio	Referred to	Date Referred	Actioned by (Inits)
29	STAMDO	26 JUL 83	
36/37	XO	30 JUL 83	
38	OPS		
38	STAMDO		
1A	WOA TM	3/8/83	

Folio	Referred to	Date Referred	Actioned by (Inits)

ARCHIVAL ACTION

close 2/pkts		

FILE No 8

17	26	AIR

Part No 1

Stock No 7530–66–093–3093

RESTRICTED

17/26 AIR

HQWLM 17/26/AIR PT1

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE FILING OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE HANDLING OF FILES ARE CONTAINED IN DEPARTMENTAL AND SINGLE SERVICE MANUALS

CLOSELY RELATED FILES				
File Number				Subject

FILE NO	17	26	MR	Part 1

TITLE EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER

— RESTRICTED —

Referred To	Date	Referred To	Date	Referred To	Date
~~XO~~	~~4 JUL 83~~				
~~STAFF~~	~~26 JUL 83~~				
~~XO~~	~~9 AUG 83~~				
~~HELLO~~	~~10 AUG 83~~				

Department of Defence
AR 40—1 (Blue) (Rev 1975)
Stock No: 7530-66-096-4988

FILE LOCATION CARD

When Complete Use Other Side

Rule out last column on front of card before commencing entries on this side.

Referred To	Date	Referred To	Date	Referred To	Date

A 273
Re[illegible] Aug 79
St[illegible]. 7530-66-052-8064
MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS

38
36

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
20CU	2/3/Air Pt3 (3)	1 Aug 83	A. HQOC SIGEM1 018/COFS of 25 Jul 83 B. 20CU/2/3/Air (1) of 20 Jul 83

To: HQWLM
Attention: STANDO
For Information:
Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

RECEIVED
- 1 AUG 1983
HQWLM

1. Reference A requested details of equipment / manpower resources committed and manpower overtime hours accrued during Operation Close Encounter. Reference B advised overtime hours accrued.

2. During the exercise, the following shifts were worked by aircrew:

a. 1 Jul 83 0500 - 1500 6 pilots + 1 desk officer (3hrs o'time),

b. 1/2 Jul 83 1500 - 0100 1 pilot for 3hrs (77SQN remainder),

c. 2 Jul 83 0100 - 1000 6 pilots + 1 desk O, and

d. 2/3 Jul 83 1600 - 0200 " " .

3. Ground crew worked similar shifts with an additional shift on Sunday and 0500 start on Sunday. Each shift consisted of 1 x Engo and 12 airmen.

4. During each shift, two aircraft were on alert with two more aircraft on standby to relieve at shift changeover.

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
RBAdam	R.B. ADAM	FLTLT	ADMINO	6725

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS

	ACT	INF
HQWLM	✓	
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
26SQN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
SAR		

ACTION TO BE TAKEN

REPLY TO [illegible] (COPY HQWLM)

REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE

REPLY TO HQWLM BY

HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
OC			
ATMINSO			
XO			
OPSO			
STANDO			
BFSO			
INTELO			
ORWOFF			
WOD			

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

37
36

73
ed Aug 79
Stock No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References:
3 CRW	83/59/AIR(32)	28 JULY 83	A. HQDC EMI 018/COFS of 25 0064 0Z JUL 83

To	Attention
HQWCM	STANDO

For Information

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

RECEIVED 29 JUL 1983 HQWCM

1. Please find attached an account of 3 CRW's decisive efforts in the recent UFO hunt, commonly known as "Operation Close Encounters".

2. This report was originally raised at Unit level in the belief that someone, somewhere, someday would ask for it. Thus, although it is not in direct response to your request as a result of Reference A, it should contain the information sought among a host of other exciting revelations.

3. Perhaps the only additional information necessary is that each shift involved about twenty persons, all ranks. Naturally the entire hardware and software resources of 3 CRW were devoted to the task.

Enclosure: 3 CRW/83/59/AIR( ) OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

17/26/83

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
K A Keenan	K. A. KEENAN	SQNDR	XO	6158

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

	FOR	
	ACT	INF
HQWLM	✓	
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
26SQN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
SAR		PD

ACTION TO BE TAKEN

REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)

REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE

REPLY TO HQWLM BY

~~XO~~ NP

HQWLM	ACT	INF	INFO
OC	✓		
ADMINSO			
XO	✓		
OPSO			
STANDO			
BFSO			
INTELO			
ORWOFF			
WOD			

BF on file

Other inputs?

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

Reference: A. HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects.

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Base Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.

7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occassional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Gardon, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,

b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and

c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. FLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interference colloquially known as 'running rabbits' and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,

b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,

c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and

d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A pi ture was then drawn from a position as close

to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possible. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as member were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flight personnel applied themselves to the task

with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceeding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,

b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the observed objects,

c. seeking advice and assistance from better q[illegible]ed or more experienced personnel

when available, and

d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and

e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.

(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

14 Jul 83

ANNEXES:

A. Record and Plot of UFO contacts by AACC Sydney from 302035Z JUN 83 to 012359Z JUL 83

B. Record and Plot from 020001Z to 022359Z JUL 83

C. Record and Plot from 030001Z to 032359Z JUL 83

D. Chronological record of UFO contacts throughout Operation Close Encounters

RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRU 83/59/AIR( )
DATED 14 JULY 1983

UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
302035 JUN 83 TO 012359 JUL 83

TIME	REPORTED BY	BRG/RANGE (m)	HDG	SPEED	REMARKS
302035	SYD	(005SYD125) 355WLM50	050	FAST(1)	Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU
010322	SYD	275SYD105	NW	FAST	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0340	SYD	340SYD130	?	?	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0515	SYD	(079SYD127) 115WLM120	070	SLOW	Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc From FL240.
0605	SYD	335SYD155	030	FAST	Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.
0733	SYD	005SYD155	030	FAST	2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0742	SYD	005SYD72	030	FAST	3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0936	SYD	(019SYD78) 090WLM10	?	?	uery by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CR
1028	SYD	(357SYD87) 300WLM25	020	M1.2	60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.
1120	SYD	050SYD120	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1121	SYD	050SYD135	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1446	SYD	(005SYD138) 355WLM65	030	FAST	Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2018	SYD	010SYD98	020	FAST	Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CR
2214	SYD	360SYD110	N	FAST	Faded 350SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2216	SYD	360SYD138	N	V.FAST	Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU
2216:20	SYD	003SYD145	N	V.FAST	
2216:30	SYD	003SYD158	N	V.FAST	
2221	SYD	012SYD165	?	?	One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU
2325	SYD	003SYD153	020	FAST	Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005SYD163 and faded at 005SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.

Notes:
1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.

RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO
3CRU/83/59/AIR
DATED 14 JULY 1983

UFO REPORTS SIGHTED BY AACC SYDNEY
FROM 020001Z - 022359Z JUL 83

TIME (Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPEED	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECTOR 8	005/100	N	FAST	-	Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.
0320	SECTOR 8	336/124	N	400	-	Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	-	16 sweeps at sector 7: when plotted by 3CRU on paper, HDG, and SPD works out at 040 1050 knots (± 200). Not seen by 3CRU.
0437½	SECTOR 7	005/135				
0439	SECTOR 7	008/150				
0608	SECTOR 7	005/137	025	700	-	13 sweeps at sect 7. Not seen by 3CRU
0609	SECTOR 7	008/158				
0630	SECTOR 7	003/90	010	600+	-	3 good paints. Not seen 3CRU
0636	SECTOR 7	005/112	010	600+	-	1 paint only. (possibly related to previous contact)
1803	SECTOR 7	004/154	060	-	-	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU.
2240	SECTOR 7	357/87	170	900	-	Held as firm contact by SYD for 20+ Nmiles. Not seen by 3CRU or WLM SURAD
2241	SECTOR 7	355/62				

ANNEX C TO
3CRU/83/59/AIR
DATED 14 JULY 1983

UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
030001Z JUL 83 - 032359Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPEED	HT	REMARKS
0321	SYD	330/140	120	600	EST HIGH	Contact for 6 sweeps (approx 12 miles
0643	SYD	350/135	170	-	-	No SPD/HT given.
0703	SYD	352/148	170	-	-	No SPD/HT given. 3 sweeps only.
0953	SYD	356/125	S	400	-	Believed by SYD to be interference, heavy weather in area. Not seen by 3CRU.
0953	WLM APP	011/112 (340WLM40)	170	M1.5 to M2	-	Held briefly by WLM SUR. D. Plots about 15 Nmiles SE of SYD contact at same time. Heavy WX. 3 paints only. Not seen by 3CRU.
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310WLM40)	180	400	-	Classified aircraft which fle on to SYD. Lines up with SYD 0953 report.
1411	SYD	010/115	S	-	-	Held until faded over WLM at 1425. Not seen by 3CRU. Heavy weather in area.
2310	SYD	010/140	180	-	-	Held 2 - 3 sweeps by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU. Not seen SURAD.

Note:

'Cease Tell' occured from 2310 at start of conference with DOA technicians at Mascot.

RESTRICTED

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY



ANNEX D TO
3CRU/83/59/AIR
DATED 14 JULY 1983

418

36

NNNNV ZCOHA000 HH

RR RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 022 206638

ZNY RRRRR

R 250640Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EMI

018/COFS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 01JUL83

1. THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS OF HQWLM AND HQAMB PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER RESOURCES COMMITTED AND THE MANPOWER OVERTIME HOURS ACCRUED IN MEETING THIS TASK

BT

NNNN

RESTRICTED

'83 JUL 25 11 20

RAAF COMMCEN

RECEIVED 26 JUL 1983 HQWLM

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN		ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM	✓		REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	HQWLM			
BSWLM				OC			
481SQN				ADMINSO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	XO	✓		
20 CU				OPSO			
4 FLT				STANDO			
1CRU			REPLY TO HQWLM BY	BFSO			
36SQN				INTELO			
AJWE				ORWOFF			
66GL				WOD			
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: XO PD. I had asked Wmts to report.

ZF on file

17/26/AIR (A)

Reply has been sent this is probably second copy of action signal. KH.

RESTRICTED

A 273
Revised Aug 79
Stock No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

RECEIVED 28 JUL 1983 HQWLM

From	File	Date	References
BSWLM	17/2/AIR (16)	28 JUL 83	A. HQWLM EMI 018/COFS of 25 JUL 83

To: HQWLM
Attention: STANDO

For Information:

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

THE FOLLOWING BSWLM DETAILS ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF A:

SECTION	EQUIPMENT / MANPOWER	HOURS ACCRUED
ATC	MANPOWER	208
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	MANPOWER - RADTECHG	196
	- COMMSOP	116
EQUIPMENT	MANPOWER (WAREHOUSE AND FUEL FARM)	124
TRANSPORT	MANPOWER	80
	EQUIPMENT (SWEEPER)	16
CATERING	MANPOWER	350
	EQUIPMENT - MEALS CONSUMED 105	—
MEDICAL	MANPOWER - NURS	130
	MO	130
	TOTAL BSWLM MANHOURS ACCRUED	1334

REF A 17/20 (AIR)

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
	B. VITNELL	FLTLT	ADMINI	6171

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM	✓		REPLY DIRECT	OC			
~~BSWLM~~			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO		✓	
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO	✓		
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Actioned by STANDO on 28 JUL 83

Orwoff

OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only

LINE 1

LINE 2

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

'83 JUL 28 5 21

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY		280515Z JUL 83	TABULATE

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM HQ WLM

TO HQ OC

SIG/ORIG NO: EMI

OPS /XO

GR

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A EMI 018/COFS OF 250640Z JUL 83

1 IN RESPONSE TO REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED

A BSWLM

SECTION	EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER	HOURS ACCRUED
ATC	MANPOWER	204
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	MANPOWER - RADTECH	196
	- COMMSOP	116
EQUIPMENT - WAREHOUSE	MANPOWER	124
- FUEL FARM		
TRANSPORT	MAN POWER	80
	EQUIPMENT (SWEEPER)	-16-
CATERING	MAN POWER	350
	EQUIPMENT	- 105 MEALS -
MEDICAL	MANPOWER MO	130
	NUR	130
MARINE	MANPOWER	
	EQUIPMENT CRASH BOAT ON STANDBY	650
TOTAL MAN HOURS FOR UNIT		1984

B 2 OCU

AIRCREW	2OCU INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF	175
ENGINEERING OFFICERS		43
TECHNICAL AIRMEN		540

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
1			

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
3			

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN

LINE 1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTD

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM

TO

SIG/ORIG NO

GR

EQUIPMENT 3x MIR 3 ON ALERT
NIL FLYING

TOTAL FOR UNIT 756 HRS

C 77 SQN

AIRCREW ONLY 208 HRS

TOTAL FOR UNIT 208 HRS

D 481 SQN

SECTION	MAN HOURS
MMIS AND STRIP CLEARANCE	386 HRS
GSES	124 HRS
TOTAL FOR UNIT	510 HRS

E HQ WLM SAR FLT

MANPOWER	AIRCREW	130 HRS
	TECHNICAL AIRMEN	130 HRS
EQUIPMENT	1 UHIB ON STANDBY	NIL FLYING
TOTAL FOR UNIT		260 HRS

F 3 CRU

MANPOWER	– MAINTENANCE	900
	ADMINISTRATION	144
	OPERATIONS	562

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
2			

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
3			

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTD

Stock No 7530–66–094–6819

OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

LINE 1

LINE 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTRICTED

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM

TO

SIG/ORIG NO

GR

EQUIPMENT

SERVICE TRANSPORT TO AND FROM MASCOT APPROX 1000 KM

ONE C130 DIVERTED TO MASCOT TO DROP PAX

NINE MAN DAYS OF INCIDENTAL ALLOWANCE

TOTAL FOR UNIT 1596 HRS

TOTAL MAN HOURS FOR FORMATION 5316 EQUALS 221·5 MAN DAYS

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
3	K F JOHNSON STANDO HQWLM	6081	17/26/AIR (34)

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
3	SQDRN LDR R.F. LOWERY XO HQ WLM		24 JUL 87

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530–66–094–6819

33

STANDO
Ken, this is not yet properly typed but I think it contains all you need.

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

Reference: A. HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

You may also wish to know that each shift used about 20 people, all ranks.

INTRODUCTION

K Meeran
XO 3CRU

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects.

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Bae Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.

7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occassional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Gardon, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,

b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and

c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. FLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interface colloquially known as 'running rabbits and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,

b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,

c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and

d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A picture was en drawn from a position as close

to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possibel. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as member were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flight personnel applied themselves to the task

with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceeding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,

b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the abserved objects,

c. seeking advice and assistance from better qualified or more experienced personnel

when available, and

d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and

e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.

(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

20 Jul 83

ANNEX A TO
3CRU 83/59/AIR( )
DATED 14 JULY 1983

UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
302035 JUN 83 TO 012359 JUL 83

TIME	REPORTED BY	BRG/RANGE (m)	HDG	SPEED	REMARKS
302035	SYD	(005SYD125) 355WLM50	050	FAST(1)	Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU
010322	SYD	275SYD105	NW	FAST	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0340	SYD	340SYD130	?	?	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0515	SYD	(079SYD127) 115WLM120	070	SLOW	Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc From FL240.
0605	SYD	335SYD155	030	FAST	Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.
0733	SYD	005SYD155	030	FAST	2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0742	SYD	005SYD72	030	FAST	3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0936	SYD	(019SYD78) 090WLM10	?	?	Query by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CR
1028	SYD	(357SYD87) 300WLM25	020	M1.2	60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.
1120	SYD	050SYD120	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1121	SYD	050SYD135	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1446	SYD	(005SYD138) 355WLM65	030	FAST	Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2018	SYD	010SYD98	020	FAST	Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CR
2214	SYD	360SYD110	N	FAST	Faded 350SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2216	SYD	360SYD138	N	V.FAST	Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU
2216:20	SYD	003SYD145	N	V.FAST	
2216:30	SYD	003SYD158	N	V.FAST	
2221	SYD	012SYD165	?	?	One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU
2325	SYD	003SYD153	020	FAST	Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005SYD163 and faded at 005SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.

Notes:
1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.

ANNEX B TO
3CRU/BS/59/AIR
DATED 16 JUL 83

UFO REPORTS [illegible] BY ARCC SYDNEY FROM 0200012Z – 0223592Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
0320	"	336/124	N	400	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRU
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	—	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7; WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRU ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WORKS OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (± 200) NS3CRU
0437½	"	005/135				
0439	"	008/150				
0608	"	005/137	025	700	—	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRU
0609	"	008/152				
0630	"	003/90	010	600+	-	3 GOOD PAINTS. NS3CRU
0636	"	005/112	010	600+	—	1 PAINT ONLY (POSS. RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONTACT).
1803	"	004/154	060	-	-	HELD BRIEFLY. NS3CRU
2240	"	357/87	170	900	—	HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ NMILES. NSCRU OR WLM SURAD
2241		355/62				

ANNEX C TO
3CRU/83/S9/AIR( )
DATED 14 JUL 83

UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY ARCC SYDNEY FROM 030001Z JUL 83 TO 032359Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0321	SY	330/140	120°	600	EST HIGH	CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12MI
0643	SY	350/135	170°	–	–	NO SPD/HT GIVEN.
0703	SY	352/148	170°	–	–	NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.
0953	SY	356/125	S	400	–	BELIEVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERENC HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. NS3CRU
0953	WLM APP	001/112 (3KPS WLM 40)	170	M1.5 to M2.0	–	HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAD. PLOTS ABOUT 15 NMILES SE OF SYD CONTR AT SAME TIME. HEAVY WX. 3 PASS ONLY. NS3CRU
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310 WLM 40)	[illegible]	400	–	CLASSIFIED AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW ON TO SYD. LINES UP WITH SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.
1411	SY	010/115	S	–	–	HELD UNTIL FADED OVER WLM AT 1425. NS3CRU. HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA.
2310	SY	010/140	180	–	–	HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD NS3CRU NSSURAD

NOTE: 'CEASE TELL' OCCURED FROM 2310 AT START OF CONFERENCE WITH DOA TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY



ANNEX D TO
3CAD/E3/5/5/AIR
DATED 14 JUL 83

32

28 6184

No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

3CRU/83/59/AIR(30)
cc3CRU/5/7/AIR(5)

12 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTERS'

Reference: HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI dated 300350ZJUN83

INTRODUCTION

1. Following receipt of Reference A, Operation 'Close Encounters' was set in train to resolve unexplained sightings of allegedly airborne, man-made objects by the staff of the Sydney AACC. The movements of these objects were said to be consistent with those of aircraft.

AIM

2. As requested by HQWLM, this report will outline, very briefly, the effects of this operation on 3CRU.

METHOD

3. 3CRU was directed at 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to begin surveillance at 0600 hours Friday 1 July 1983. The unit was organized into two shifts of 12 hours duration with sufficient technical staff on hand to provide a specialist for all types of equipment outside normal working hours and sufficient operations staff to ensure that those on surveillance would always be fresh and alert. Some equipment and administrative support was also required.

4. A report chain was established with RAAF ATC Sector 8, Mascot and UHF communications were maintained with aircraft on alert 2 in case of scrambles.

5. From the start, unit executives and controllers entertained doubts about the soundness of the theories held by DOA members. Furthermore, nothing was seen on the TPS-43 radar which correlated with DOA sightings, so a team of three Air Defence Controllers was despatched to AACC Mascot to investigate the matter in greater depth.

RESULTS

6. The investigating team proved beyond reasonable doubt by Sunday 3 July 1983 that the unidentified objects were generated entirely from interference within the processor of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR). At no time were any correlated sightings made by 3CRU, SURAD WLM or the Round Mountain Radar near Armidale.

7. All sightings were plotted along with chronological records and remarks made at the time. A more comprehensive report including all this detail is held at 3CRU and is available if required. No aircraft were scrambled.

	ACT	INF
HQWLM		
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
26SQN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
AR		

ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC			
	ADMINSO			
	XO			
REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	OPSO			
	STANDO			
	BFSO			
REPLY TO HQWLM BY	INTELO			
	ORWOFF			
	WOD			

IAL INST

COSTS

8. Accrued overtime for this operation totalled 66½ man days, being 37½ days for technical staff, 23 for operations and 6 for equipment and administrative support. Officers naturally worked a considerable number of extra rostered hours and several attended voluntarily for various periods.

9. The cost of sending the three officers to Sydney is not yet fully known. A Service vehicle was used continuously for 3 days and some out of pocket meals and phone calls will have to be claimed for.

10. No 6 ADIO course was started one day late as a direct result, and scheduled maintenance fell behind by three days.

CONCLUSION

11. In spite of the alarming contents of Reference A, no corroboration of UFOs was offered by any other agency and the mystery was laid to rest quickly by an investigative team from 3CRU/114MCRU using common sense and methods that could have been applied at AACC Mascot before Reference A was raised. While 3CRU's financial costs attributable to the operation appear slight there was a much greater cost in accrued overtime for airmen, disruption of domestic and operational routines and delays in the training schedule. Fortunately there was no temptation to launch aircraft and add to the fuel bill occasioned by use of the RAAF Datsun between 3CRU, Sydney AACC and 2SD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Data linking between the various radar sensors in South Eastern Australia (upon which preliminary work has been done) should be progressed as a priority matter. Direct comparisons could then be made at any time and false alarms could be avoided by early discussion between agencies.

K A Keenan

(K.A. KEENAN)
Squadron Leader
T/Commanding Officer

[redacted]3
[redacted]ed Aug 79
[redacted]ck No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
BSWLM	17/2/AIR (16)	26 JUL 83	A. HQOC FMI 016/COFS of 25 JUL 83

To: HQWLM
Attention: STANDO

For Information:

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

THE FOLLOWING BSWLM DETAILS ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF A:

SECTION	EQUIPMENT / MANPOWER	HOURS ACCRUED
ATC	MANPOWER	208
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	MANPOWER - RADTECHG	136
	- COMMSOP	116
EQUIPMENT	MANPOWER (WAREHOUSE AND FUEL FARM)	124
TRANSPORT	MANPOWER	80
	EQUIPMENT (SWEEPER)	16
CATERING	MANPOWER	350
	EQUIPMENT - MEALS CONSUMED 105	—
MEDICAL	MANPOWER - NURS	130
	MO	130
	TOTAL BSWLM MANHOURS ACCRUED	1334
MARINE	MANPOWER	660
	EQUIPMENT 1 CRAFT ON SBY	
	TOTAL	1994

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No
[signature]	B. VITNELL	FLTLT	ADMINI	6171

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

A 273 Revi Aug 79
Stock 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
20CU	2/3/AIR (1)	20JUL83	A. HQWLM OPORDER 11/83 of 1 JUL83

To	Attention
HQWLM	XO
For Information	
77SQN	CO

Subject
EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER – OVERTIME ACCRUED

RECEIVED 20 JUL 83 HQWLM

1. As directed by OC, the following overtime data is provided for duty associated with Exercise Close Encounter:

Aircrew (20CU instructional staff)	175 hours
Engineering Officers	43 hours
Technical Airmen	540 hours
Total for Unit	758 hours

2. The overtime hours above cover 20CU personnel and exclude 77 SQN aircrew who worked standby shifts over the weekend 2/3 JUL83.

3. Apart from four sorties of tactical intercepts (staff continuation training) flown at the end of alert periods before the start of the normal flying day on 1JUL83, no flying was achieved as a result of the exercise alert. Indeed, the requirement to maintain alert states through Friday 1JUL83 forced the cancellation of six sorties of staff continuation training.

461 SQN 386 MMIS & STRIP CLEARANCE 77 SQN 208 HRS AIRCREW,
124 GSEs
SAR FLT 2x6S TECH AIRMEN
2x6S AIR CREW

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
MBNixon	M.B. NIXON	WGCDR	CO 20CU	6770

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

	FOR	
	ACT	INF
HQWLM		
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
265QN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
SAR		

ACTION TO BE TAKEN
REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)
REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE
REPLY TO HQWLM BY

HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
OC			
ADMINSO			
XO	H		
OPSO			
STANDO			
BFSO			
INTELO			
ORWOFF			
WOD			

— BF on file

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

418

NNNN CZCOHA000 HH

RR RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 022 2060638

ZNY RRRRR

R 250640Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EMI

018/COFS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 01JUL83

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED 8 JUL 1983 HQWLM

'83 JUL 25 11:20

RAAF COMMCEN

(4). 29/23

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM	✓		(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
77SQN	✓		REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU	✓		FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO	✓		
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO STANDO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL			1 AUG 83				
PTS							
SAR	✓						

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: STANDO Please consolidate hq. xo. oc HQ

1. THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS OF HQWLM AND HQAMB PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER RESOURCES COMMITTED AND THE MANPOWER OVERTIME HOURS ACCRUED IN MEETING THIS TASK

BT

17/26/AIR (A1)

STANDO
Not (Folsi)
(HQOC) AOC wants to know by Friday 29 July 83

RESTRICTED

NNNN

28

RESTRICTED

098

'83 JUL -4 -7 :15

NNNNVZCZCOHA705 HH

PP RAYRWB

RAAF
COMMCEN

DE RAYWPA 209 1850701

ZNY RRRRR

P R 040701Z JUL 83

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

835/DGOPS-AF

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM	✓	✓	REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO		H	
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WGD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/MR
pm

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83

1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.

2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B

BT

RECEIVED
- 5 JUL 1983

RESTRICTED

27

101 IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED

'83 JUL -4 -7 :26

NNNNVZCZCOHA711 HH

OO RAYRWB

RAAF COMMCEN

DE RAYROB 005 1850700

ZNY RRRRR

O 040656Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

410/COFS

FOR OCS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM	✓		REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO	✓		
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/AIR (AA)

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 040615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.

2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

26

VZCZCOHA664 HH

IMMEDIATE

CO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 949 1850517 '83 JUL -4 -5 :37

ZNY RRRRR

O R 040520Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

398/SOOPSB

	FOR ACT	FOR INF
HQWLM	✓	
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
26SQN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
SAR		

RAAF COMMCEN

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM) / REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE / REPLY TO HQWLM BY

		ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM		✓		
OC				
ADMINSO				
XO				
OPSO				
STANDO				
BFSO				
INTELO				
ORWOFF				
WOD				

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/MA (WPI)

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STROPS OF 4JUL83

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVMENT IN OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDEPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS

BT

RESTRICTED

25

831

RESTRICTED

NNNNVZCZCOHA2316

00 RAYRWB

DE RAYWPA 063 1820514

ZNY RRRRR

O R 010514Z JUL 83 ZZM1

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

A0917/DGOPS-AF

RECEIVED HQWLM 4 JUL 1983 HH

'83 JUL -1 -5 58

RAAF RUTMMLEN

	FOR INFO		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				MFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOO			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

This message is a correction. Destroy other copies.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/APR (NA)

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPSAF/COFS OF 30 JUN 83

B. HQOC 073/SOINT OF 300350Z JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SUR-VEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.

RESTRICTED

3. AIRCRAFT STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS ARE AT DISCRETION OF AOCOC, HOWEVER THE PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST OF THE TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE TO BE COVERED.

4. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED ON VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT, REPEAT, NOT TO CARRY WEAPONS.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO DEFAIR (DOPS-AF) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CURRENT AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS.

B. ANY FURTHER DETECTIONS OF SIMILAR TRACKS AND DETAILS OF ANY RESPONISVE ACTION ARE TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

C. A SITREP IS TO BE FORWARDED DAILY TO COVER THE SITUATION TO 1000 HOURS LOCAL. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS, ADVICE ON ANY PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF THE TRACKS AND ANY HQOC RECOMMENDATIONS.

D. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE CONSLUSION OF THE OPERATION.

6. AT THIS STAGE IT IS PLANNED THAT AIRCRAFT STANDBY BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF ALL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS

BT

OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

24

LINE 1

LINE 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

LINE 3

'83 JUL -4 -1 :38

LINE 4

LINE 5

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY		040130Z JUL83	TABULATE

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM HQNLM

TO HQOC

INFO DEFAIR CANBERRA
HQ AMB

SIG/ORIG NO
SIG ADA
OTE / XO

GR

HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 3

A DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL83
B HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1 2xMIR AND 1x F111 RELEASED FROM ALERT SIXTY WEF 032200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL RECOMMENCE, IF NECESSARY, AT 040800Z JUL 83.

2. 3CRU REMAINS ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS. SURAD AND FULL ATC SERVICES REMAIN ON CALL OUTSIDE PROMULGATED OPERATING HOURS.

3 UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD, BUT NOT VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER CIVIL OR MILITARY RADAR, ARE:

TIME	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
0321	330 SYD 140	120	600K	HELD FOR 6 SWEEPS

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
1			
NO OF PAGES	**RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE**	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
2			

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

LINE 1

LINE 2

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM

TO

SIG/ORIG NO

GR

TIME	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
0634	350 SYD 135	170	–	HELD BRIEFLY
0703	352 SYD 148	170	–	HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS
0953	356 SYD 125	S	400K	BELIEVED WX INTERFERANCE
1411	010 SYD 115	S	–	HELD UNTIL 1425. HEAVY WX IN AREA.
2310	010/140	180	–	HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS.

4. IN VIEW OF THIS AND PREVIOUS SITREPS, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND RETURN OF F111A TO AMB. IF F111 RESPONSE STILL CONSIDERED NECESSARY SUGGEST OC AMB BE TASKED TO PROVIDE ONE F111 ON ALERT 60 AT AMB BETWEEN 0800Z AND 2200Z DAILY.

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
2	GPCAPT R.F. LOWERY XO HQWLM	6001	17/26/AIR
NO OF PAGES	**RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE**	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
2	AS ABOVE		04 JUL 83

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

23

818

IMMEDIATE

'83 JUL -1 -4 55

RAAF COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA223 UU

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 422 1820407

ZNR UUUUU

O 010350Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG ADA

387/COFS

FOR OC FROM COFS

SURVEILLANCE TASKING

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY

BT

RECEIVED 4 JUL 1983 11AM

	FOR ACT	FOR INF
HQWLM		
BSWLM		
481SQN		
77SQN		
20 CU		
4 FLT		
3CRU		
265QN		
AJWE		
66GL		
PTS		
SAR		

ACTION TO BE TAKEN

REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)

REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE

REPLY TO HQWLM BY

HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
OC			
ADMINSO			
XO			
OPSO			
STANDO			
BESO			
INTELO			
ORWOFF			
WOD			

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Copy 32 of 45 22

Telephone 28.7777

Headquarters
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

HQWLM 17/26/AIR
HQWLM 7/4/AIR(2)

1 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown Operation Order No 11/83 - Exercise Close Encounter

Reference: A. Telecon COFS/OCWLM of approximately 300930ZJUN83

Time Zone Used Throughout This Order: ZULU

Task Organization: No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 77 Squadron
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
No 481 Squadron
Base SQuadron RAAF Williamtown

1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.

a. Energy Forces NIL

b. Friendly Forces NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.

a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.

b. Provision of Forces.

(1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.

(2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77SQN pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.

(3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.

(4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.

(5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77SQN or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.

3. Execution

a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DofA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.

b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.

c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.

d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1, and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.

e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCWLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.

f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENGO is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.

b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.

c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:

(1) ATC Van. The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.

(2) Refuelling Tankers. 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.

(3) Messing. All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.

(4) Central Store. Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.

5. Command and Signal

a. IFF/SIF. Routine 20CU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.

6. Acknowledgement Instructions. Do not acknowledge.

(W.D.J. MONAGHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

Distribution:	Copy Nos:
Headquarters RAAF Williamtown	1- 5
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown	6-10
No 77 Squadron	11-15
No 481 Squadron	16-21
No 2 Operational Conversion Unit	22-24
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit	25-28
Unit History	29-30
HQWLM File 7/4/Air	31
HQWLM File 16/27/Air	32
Spares	34-40
External:	
Headquarters Operational Command	33

21

651.

RESTRICTED

Read in entirety to S/L NIBLETT over phone at OC's direction 1000hrs Hul 83 GBuck.

Photocopy given to S/L BATTEN.

PRIORITY

NNNNVZCZCOHA986

PP RAYRWB RAYRWA

DE RAYROB 325 181043Z

ZNY RRRRR

P R 300350Z JUN 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWBHQWLM

INFO RAYRWA/3CRU

RAYRMD/HQRIC

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EAI

073/SOINT

UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT SIGHTING

1. SINCE 6 JUN 83 A NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED RADAR RETURNS HAVE BEEN DETECTED BY SYDNEY ATC PERSONNEL. ON EACH OCCASION THE OBSERVED RETURNS HAVE BEEN STRONG AND THE MOVEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF AN AIRCRAFT. ON ONLY ONE OCCASION WAS 3CRU ON THE AIR. WHILE 3CRU OBSERVED THE RETURN THEY WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN AN ALTITUDE.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CONTACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

072230Z JUN 83 - CTC OVER COWRA TRACKING 090 DEGREES SPEED 1400 KTS

130638Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG 170 DEGREES

170940Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTL BETWEEN 90 AND 60 NMS NTH SYD

RECEIVED 30 JUN 1983 OLM

'83 JUN 30 -6 :39

RAAF COMMCEN

Actioned by XO 1645hrs 30JUN83 30JUN83 Photocopy to FIO

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/JUN

RESTRICTED

190836Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG STH. CTC LOST 130 NMS

191948Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 60 NMS NTH SYD HDG 360 DEGREES. CTC LOST 143 NMS

232243Z JUN 83 - A/C RETURN (FAST) OBSERVED 045 DEGREES M SYD BETWEEN 110 AND 150 NMS. HDG 045 DEGREES M SPEED APPROX 1500 KTS

ALL RETURNS WERE PRIMARY AIRCRAFT PAINTS.

2. THE SOURCE OF THE RETURNS ARE UNKNOWN. D OF A RADAR TECH STAFF ARE OF THE OPINION THAT ALL RETURNS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY FROM MAN MADE OBJECT.

3. THE SIGHTINGS HAVE OCCURRED ON AN IRREGULAR BASIS AND WITH ONE EXCEPTION EITHER EARLY MORNING OR EVENING.

4. 3 CRU IS REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN INVESTIGATING THESE UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS THROUGH INCREASED OPERATING TIME, IN PARTICULAR DURING HIGH PROB PERIODS OF EARLY MORNING AND EVENING, AND BY CLOSE CO-ORDINATION WITH SYD RAAF-SECTOR EIGHT, SMACO.

5. 3 CRU IS ASKED TO ADVISE HQOC (ATTN-SOCC) OF ABILITY TO ASSIST OR ANY LIMITATIONS. THE DURATION OF INCREASED ACTIVITY REQUIRED WILL BE ADVISED, PENDING DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFAIR

BT

RESTRICTED

20

101 IMMEDIATE

'83 JUL -4 -7 :26

RAAF
COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA711 HH

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 005 1850700

ZNY RRRRR

O 040656Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

410/COFS

FOR OCS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 040615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.

2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT

RESTRICTED

098

RESTRICTED

'83 JUL -4 -7 :15

RAAF
COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA705 HH

PP RAYRWB

DE RAYWPA 209 1850701

ZNY RRRRR

P R 040701Z JUL 83

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

835/DGOPS-AF

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83

1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.

2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B

BT

RESTRICTED

065

18

VZCZCOHA664

IMMEDIATE

HH RESTRICTED

OO ZAYRWB

DE RAYROB 949 185Ø517

'83 JUL -4 -5 :37

ZNY RRRRR

O R Ø4Ø52ØZ JUL 83

RAAF COMMCEN

FM HQOC

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

398/SOOPSB

FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STROPS OF 4JUL83

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVMENT IN OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDEPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS

BT

RESTRICTED

064

17

RESTRICTED

JZCZCOHA653 HH

OO RAYRWB

'83 JUL -4 -5 :35

DE RAYROB 93Ø 185Ø445

ZNY RRRRR

RAAF COMMCEN

O R Ø4Ø432Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

397/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, WLM, AMB FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. DEFAIR ØØ3/DSO OF Ø3Ø555Z JUL 83

1. REF A AGREED TO REDUCE ALERT STATE TO ALERT 6Ø AND ADVISED CONTINUATION WOULD BE REVIEWED Ø4JUL83

2. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT, HOPEFULLY A PRESS RELEAVE, AGREED TO AT A MEETING HELD MASCOT Ø4Ø1ØØZ. QUOTE

AT A MEETING AT KINGSFORD SMITH AIRPORT MASCOT BETWEEN DOFA AND RAAF REPS IT WAS AGREED THAT: IT IS LIKELY THAT THE APPARENT RETURNS THAT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON ONE OF THE RADARS AT SYDNEY AIRPORT ARE CAUSED BY RANDOM ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE.

PAGE 2 RAYROB 93Ø R E S T R I C T E D

MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE REPORTED CONTACTS WERE AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE

IN VIEW OF ABOVE STRONGLY RECOMMEND REVERSION TO NORMAL OPERATIONS

BT

RESTRICTED

A 273
Revised Aug 79
Stock No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

16

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
3 CRU	85/59/AIR	04 JUL 83	

To	Attention
HQWLM	OC XO

For Information

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. Please find enclosed at Annex A a summary of operational information of Operation Close Encounter for the last 24 hours.

ANNEX: A. Summary of Operational Information.

RECEIVED
- 4 JUL 1983
HQWLM

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
K A Keenan	K. A. KEENAN	SQNLDR	T/CO	6158

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRU 85/59/AIR
DATED 04 JUL 83

0001Z 3 JUL 83 → 2359Z 03 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0321	SY	330/140	120°	600	EST HIGH	CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12 MILES)
0643	SY	350/135	170°	–	–	NO SPD/HT GIVEN.
0703	SY	352/148	170°	–	–	NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.
0953	SY	356/125	S	400	–	BELIEVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERENCE HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. NS3CRU
0953	WLM APP	001/112. (340 WLM 40)	170	M1.5 to M2.0	–	HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAD. PLOTS ABOUT 15 N MILES SE OF SYD CONTACT AT SAME TIME. HEAVY WX. 3 POINTS ONLY. NS3CRU
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310 WLM 40)	180	400	–	CLASSIFIED AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW ON TO SYD. LINES UP WITH SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.
1411	SY	010/115	S	–	–	HELD UNTIL FADED OVER WLM AT 1425. NS3CRU. HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA.
2310	SY	010/140	180	–	–	HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD NS3CRU NSSURAD



UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SIGHTINGS REPORTED FROM SYDNEY ATC RADAR, MASCOT AIRPORT

FROM: 0001Z 03 JUL 83 TO: 2359Z 03 JULY 83

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY



OC 33
Revised Feb 81

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

LINE 1

LINE 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

LINE 3

LINE 4 '83 JUL -3 -3 :11

LINE 5

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY PRIORITY			

ROUTINE INDICATORS

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM HQWLM

TO HQOC
DEFAIR CANBERRA

SIG/ORIG NO
SIG ADA
00 2/ X6

GR

HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A HQWLM 001/X0 OF 030050Z JUL 83

1. REF A STATED THAT ROUTINE WLM TRAINING/TASKS WILL SUFFER IF CURRENT ALERT STATES CONTINUE. ASSUMING REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT RESPONSE, BEST COMPROMISE IS TO PROVIDE 2X MIR PLUS 1X F111 ON ALERT 60. THIS WOULD OBVIATE NEED TO ROTATE ALL WLM CREWS THROUGH ALERT TWO AND COULD BE MET FROM CREWS ACCOMMODATED ON BASE. ROUTINE 20CU AND 77 SQN TRAINING WOULD BE LARGELY UNAFFECTED AND 3CRU/WLM ATC COULD RESTRUCTURE ROSTERS TO ADVANTAGE.

2. YOUR EARLIEST RESPONSE TO THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
1	GPCAPT R.F. LOWERY X0 HQWLM	6001	
NO OF PAGES	**RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE**	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
1	AS ABOVE		03 JUL 83

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

971

VZCZCOHA505 HH

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

14

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 883 1840316

ZNY RRRRR

'83 JUL -3 -3 :37

O R 030311Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

RECEIVED
- 4 JUL 1983
HQWLM

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

726/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. WLM 001/DO 030050Z SITREP NO 2.

B. HQOC 725/COFS 020341Z

1. REF A FURTHER SUBSTANTIATES OBSERVATIONS MADE IN SITREP NO 1 AND REF B THAT UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS ARE RESULT OF ELECTRONIC PHENONEMON EXCLUSIVE TO SYDNEY ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. CLOSE CONTACT WITH RADAR TECHS BEING MAINTAINED BUT AS YET NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OBTAINED

2. IN VIEW COMMENTS PARA 5 REF A. STRONGLY RECOMMEND RESPONSE BE SCALED DOWN TO LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING NORMAL TASKS.

PAGE 2 RAYROB 883 R E S T R I C T E D

3. FOR HQWLM. IF ALERT STATE WITHDRAWN ADVISE WHAT RESPONSE COULD BE GUARANTEED. ATC SURAD MAY NOW REVERT TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. 3CRU SURVEILLANCE TO CONTINUE ON 24 HOUR BASIS

BT

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED

13

HH

PP RAYROB RAYWPP RAYBBB

DE RAYRWB 272 1830052

ZNY RRRRR

P R 030050Z JUL 83

FM HQWLM

TO RAYROB/HQBC

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

001/DO

RECEIVED 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

	FOR ACT	FOR INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC			
BSWLM				ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	OPSO			
20 CU				STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO HQWLM BY	INTELO			
26SQN				ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

FOR AOCOC FROM OCWLM, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 2.

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83

B. HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X F111 RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND ALERT THIRTY RESPECTIVELY WEF 022200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL RECOMMENCE AT 030800Z JUL 83.

2. 3CRU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD ARE:

TIME	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
0230	005 SYD 100	N	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY

RESTRICTED

Ø32Ø	336 SYD 124	N	4ØØK	HELD BRIEFLY
Ø437	36Ø SYD 12Ø	Ø2Ø	75ØK	HELD FOR 16 SWEEPS
Ø6Ø8	ØØ5 SYD 137	Ø25	7ØØK	HELD FOR 13 SWEEPS
Ø63Ø	ØØ3 SYD 9Ø	Ø1Ø	6ØØK	3 PAINTS
Ø636	ØØ5 SYD 112	Ø1Ø	6ØØK	1 PAINT
18Ø3	ØØ4 SYD 154	Ø6Ø	-	HELD BRIEFLY
224Ø	357 SYD 87	17Ø	9ØØK	HELD FOR 2ØNM

4. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND RAAF PERSONNEL AT SYD AACC HAVE VERIFIED THAT THESE UNIDENTIFIED RETURNS ARE ALL GENERATED SOLEY BY SYD ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. NONE, REPEAT NONE, HAVE BEEN VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER RADAR UNIT, CIVIL OR MILITARY. THEREFORE I BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE RESULT OF SOME ELECTRONIC PHENONENON EXCLUSIVE TO SYD RADAR AND NOT EVIDENCE OF SOME UNIDENTIFIED INTRUDER.

5. CONTINUED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WILL, I BELIEVE, SERVE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS CONCLUSION, AND CONTINUED AIRCRAFT ALERT WILL THEREFORE SERVE NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN PREJUDICE WLM CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE NORMAL, IMPORTANT TASKS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM CONCERNED THAT FULL ATC SERVICES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM MONDAY IF 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE IS SUSTAINED. THIS WILL PREJUDICE OCU

TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IF WEATHER DETERIORATES. THEREFORE I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SUSPEND AIRCRAFT ALERTS FORTHWITH AND CONTINUE PURELY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNTIL FINAL DECISION CAN BE GIVEN

BT

12

A 273
ised Aug 79
k No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
3CRU	85/59/AIR	03 JUL 83	

To	Attention
HQWLM	OC XO

For Information

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. Please find enclosed a summary of operational information of CLOSE ENCOUNTER from 1000 hrs (LOCAL) 02 JUL 83 until 1000 hrs 03 JUL 83.

ANNEXES: A. Statistical Details
B. Information from GCI Controllers at Mascot.

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
K A Keenan	K.A. KEENAN	SQNLDR	T/CO	6158

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRU/85/59/AIR
DATED 03 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
0320	"	336/124	N	400	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRU
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	—	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7; WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRU ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WORKS OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (± 200) NS3CRU
0437½	"	005/135				
0439	"	008/150				
0608	"	005/137	025	700	—	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRU
0609	"	008/158				
0630	"	003/90	010	600+	—	3 GOOD PAINTS. NS3CRU
0636	"	005/112	010	600+	—	1 PAINT ONLY. (POSS. RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONTACT).
1803	"	004/154	060	—	—	HELD BRIEFLY. NS3CRU
2240	"	357/87	170	900	—	HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ N MILES. NSCRU OR WLM SURAD
2241		355/62				



UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SIGHTINGS REPORTED FROM

SYDNEY ATC RADAR, MASCOT AIRPORT

FROM: 020001Z JUL 83 TO: 022359Z JUL 83

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY



A3

RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO
3CRU/85/59/AIR
DATED 03 JUL 83

INFORMATION FROM GCI CONTROLLERS AT MASCOT

1. A surveillance and control (GCI) team is now established temporarily at Mascot ARCC and operating 24 hrs/day until otherwise directed.

2. Until certain civilian technical staff report for duty on Monday 04 Jul 83 some questions cannot be adequately or satisfactorily answered but preliminary enquiries reveal the following:

a. The sensitivity of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR) may have been significantly increased following maintenance work in early June. The upsurge of UFO activity is coincidental.

b. Although most contacts reported by ATC members have appeared to move in straight lines and almost radially relative to the RSR, some have appeared to make slight alterations of course. All such alterations, however, have been to starboard, or clockwise. When carefully plotted sweep by sweep on the radarscope there is is an appearance of spiral movement suggestive of a certain type of radar interference.

c. There is a large overlap between the RSR

RESTRICTED

and Round Mountain radar, the midpoint being about 120 n miles north of Sydney, but there is no absolute cutoff for display purposes although both displays are presumably correlated. Sydney technical staff appear confident that none of the tracks in question have been generated by Round Mountain. All have been within coverage of Sydney RSR with a high proportion within the overlap.

d. Round Mountain contacts are computer-generated. Only when the target is determined to be an aircraft and nothing else will it be presented for display. Sydney RSR approximates more to a 'raw' video display and may therefore be more prone to show a variety of dubious information.

3. At this stage GCI controllers at Mascot are sceptical of the chances that the contacts in question are solid objects, either propelled or ballistic.

K A Keenan
(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
T/CO 3CRU

869

11

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

VZCZCOKA5Ø3 HH

PP RAYRWB

'83 JUL -3 -3 :17

This message is a suspected duplicate

ZNY RRRRR ZFD RAYROB

HH

RAAF COMMCEN

PP RAYWPP RAYRWB RAYBBB

DE RAYROB 869 183Ø4Ø3

ZNY RRRRR

P Ø2Ø341Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

725/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, AMB, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

REF A. HQWLM ØØ1/DOMØ2Ø139Z. SITREP NO 1.

B. HQOC 673/SOINT 3ØJUNØ3

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STWFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-Ø3Ø AND FADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY RADAR COVERAGE 15Ø-165 NM

RESTRICTED

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEYRADIALS

RESTRICTED

C. WHILE SOME TRACKS ARE HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS VERY STRONG PAINTS THE MAJORITY ARE WEAK

D. PERIOD OF SIGHTINGS AGE REPORTED TO RANGE FROM BETWEEN ONE TO EIGHT SWEEPS AT FIVE RPM. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONS EXTENDING TO 14 SWEEPS ASSUMING SAME TRACK

D. PLOTS OFREPORTED TRACKS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH ANY KNOWN FLIGHT PROFILES OF ANY MAN MADE OBJECT NOR ARE OBSERVATIONS CONSISTENT WITH ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

E. MAJORITY OF THE REPORTED SIGHTINGS HAVE BEEN IN LOCATIONS WITHIN ROUND MOUNTAIN, WLM SURAD AND 3CRU RADAR COVERAGE. DOFA AND RAAF ATC STAFF CONFIRM THAT NO TRACKS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY ROUND MOUNTAIN SINCE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS WERE FIRST OBSERVED. WLM STAFF ALSO CONFIRM THEY ALSO HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SPECIFIC TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY AS UNIDENTIFIED OR ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OF UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS ON WLM RADAR. REF B INDICATED THAT ONE TRACK HAD BEEN CORROBORATED BY 3CRU. FURTHER INQUIRIES REVEAL THAT THIS RESULTED FROM A RATHER CASUAL INQUIRY FROM SYDNEY RELATING TO AN OBSERVED TRACK ABOUT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS. WHILE NOT DETRACTING FROM THE ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT IT DOES RAISE EXTREME DOUBTS ON WHETHER THIS UNRECORDED INTERCHANGE COULD

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

BE REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONTINUING

BT

NNNN

RESTRICTED

OC 33
Revised Feb 79

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for **COMMCEN/SIGS** use only.

10

LINE 1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY		020139Z JUL 83	TABULATE

ROUTING INDICATORS — *Note: Write only one addressee per line*

FROM HQWLM
TO HQOC
INFO DEFAIR
HQAMB

RECEIVED
- 4 JUL 1983
HQWLM

SIG/ORIG NO
SIG ADA
001/D.O

GR

HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 1

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83
B. HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X FUL RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND ALERT THIRTY RESPECTIVELY WEF 012359Z JUL 83. AIRCRAFT WILL RESUME ABOVE ALERT STATES AT 020600Z JUL 83.

2. 3CRU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD WERE:

TIME(Z)	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
2035	005 SYD 125	050	FAST	HELD 12 SECS
0322	275 SYD 105	NW	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY
0340	340 SYD 130	–	–	HELD BRIEFLY
0605	335 SYD 155	030	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
1			
NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
2			

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

CC 33
Revised Feb 79

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for **COMMCEN/SIGS** use only.

LINE 1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY			TABULATE

ROUTING INDICATORS

Note: Write only one addressee per line

FROM

TO

SIG/ORIG NO

GR

TIME(Z)	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
0733	005 SYD 155	030	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS
0742	005 SYD 172	020	FAST	HELD 3 SWEEPS
0936	019 SYD 78	-	-	ONE PAINT
1028	357 SYD 87	020	FAST	HELD 60 SECS
1120	050 SYD 120	-	-	ONE PAINT
1121	005 SYD 135	-	-	ONE PAINT
1446	005 SYD 138	030	FAST	HELD FOR 20 NM
2018	010 SYD 98	020	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY
2214	360 SYD 110	N	FAST	HELD 15 SECS
2216	360 SYD 138	N	V FAST	HELD 30 SECS
2221	012 SYD 165	-	-	HELD ONE SWEEP
2325	003 SYD 153	020	FAST	HELD 120 SECS

NEITHER 3 CRU NOR SURAD ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH ANY OF ABOVE

4. NIL SCRAMBLE ACTION TAKEN

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
2	6PCAPT R.F. LOWERY XO HQ WXM	6001	

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
2	AS ABOVE		02 JUN 83

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

9

A 273
Revised Aug 79
Stock No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

From	File	Date	References
3CW	83/59/AIR	02 JUL 83	

To	Attention
HQWLM	OC XO

For Information

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. Please find enclosed operational details of CLOSE ENCOUNTER from commencement to 1700 hrs local 02 JUL 83.

ANNEX: A. 2 Copies of operational details from commencement until 1700 hrs 02 JUL 83

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
KAKeenan	K.A. KEENAN	SQNLDR	T/CO	6158

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRU 83/59/ATR
DATED 02 JUL 83

Z TIME	REPORTED BY	BRG (M) / RANGE	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
30 2035 JUN	SYD	(005 SYD 125) 355 WLM 50	050	FAST(1)	HELD 12 SECONDS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
01 0322 JUL	SYD	275 SYD 105	NW	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
0340	SYD	340 SYD 130	?	?	" " " " " "
0515	SYD	(079 SYD 127) 115 WLM 120	070	SLOW	CLASSIFIED MET BALLON. HELD BY 3CRU. FADED 120/135 ON DESC FROM FL240
0605	SYD	335 SYD 155	030	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS. NOT HELD BY 3CRU
0733	SYD	005 SYD 155	030	FAST	2 SWEEPS, NOT SEEN BY 3CRU.
0742	SYD	005 SYD 72	030	FAST	3 SWEEPS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU.
0936	SYD	(019 SYD 78) 090 WLM 10	?	?	QUERY BY SYD. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRU
1028	SYD	(357 SYD 87) 300 WLM 25	020	M1.2	60 SECONDS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
1120	SYD	050 SYD 120	?	?	SINGLE ECHO. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
1121	SYD	005 SYD 135	?	?	" " " " " "
1446	SYD	(005 SYD 138) 355 WLM 65	030	FAST	REPORT AS FASTER THAN NORMAL JET TRAFFIC. HELD FOR 20 N MILES BY SYD. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRU
2018	SYD	010 SYD 98	020	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRU
2214	SYD	360 SYD 110	N	FAST	FADED 350 SYD 120 AFTER 15 SECS HELD BY SYD. NOT SEEN 3CRU
2216	SYD	360 SYD 138	N	V. FAST	PROBABLY REAPPEARANCE OF 2214 TRACK. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRU
2216:20	SYD	003 SYD 145	N	V. FAST	
2216:30	SYD	003 SYD 158	N	V. FAST	
2221	SYD	012 SYD 165	?	?	ONE SWEEP NOT SEEN BY 3CRU.
2325	SYD	003 SYD 153	020	FAST	TRACK APPEARED TO TURN ONTO 030° AT 005 SYD 163 AND FADED AT 005 SYD 165. HELD BY SYD LESS THAN 2 MINS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRU.

NOTES

1. FAST INDICATES NOT BELOW 600 KNOTS. SOME SPEEDS APPEAR WELL IN EXCESS OF 1000 KTS



FP _____ (CALLSIGN) M _____ (MIL) _____ (TYPE)

_____ (FROM) _____ (TO) _____ (ETD/ATD)

REPORTING POINTS	FL	+ TIME
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS
REPORTED TO 3CRU
BY SECTOR 8, SYDNEY
FROM 3Ø2Ø352 JUN 83
TO Ø1 2359 JUL 83


0001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2359 ∅
(REPORTED)
PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS
3∅ JUN 83
∅1 JUL 83

02 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
0320	"	336/124	N	400	—	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRW
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	—	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7: WHEN PLOTTED
0437½	"	005/135				BY 3CRW ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WORKS
0439	"	008/150				OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (±200) NS3CRW
0608	"	005/137	025	700	—	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRW
0609	"	008/158				



FP _____ (CALLSIGN) M (MIL) _____ (TYPE)

_____ (FROM) _____ (TO) _____ (ETD/ATD)

REPORTING POINTS	FL	+ TIME
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Start 020001 Z 83

OC 33
Revised Feb 79

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for **COMMCEN/SIGS** use only.

8

LINE 1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: RESTRICTED

'83 JUL -1 12:27

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY		012202Z JUL 83	

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

ROUTING INDICATORS — Note: Write only one addressee per line

FROM HQWLM

TO HQOC

INFO DEFAIR

SIG/ORIG NO: SIG ADA /

GR

IP ~~FOR COF~~ HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A HQOC 387/COFS OF 01 JUL 83
B DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 0105 14Z JUL 83
C HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. Requirements of Refs A to C are being implemented. Two F-111 aircraft have arrived and crews are briefed. However, crews are out of duty time and have been stood down. One F-111 will be on ALERT THIRTY, wef 012000Z JUL 83. Meanwhile, two Mirages are on ALERT TWO continuously. 3CARU is on 24 hour operation.

2. In light of para 2 ref C, a review of all available records of contacts by AACC, indicate nil contacts any day between 2359Z and 0600Z. Will therefore mount two shifts of aircraft alert between 0600Z and 2359Z daily. CARU will continue 24 hour operation but at reduced manning during alert stand down.

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

OC 33
Revised Feb 79

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for **COMMCEN/SIGS** use only.

LINE 1
LINE 2
LINE 3
LINE 4
LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE – ACTION	PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE	DATE – TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY			

ROUTING INDICATORS

Note: Write only one addressee per line

FROM

TO

SIG/ORIG NO

GR

3. Regarding para 5 ref C, one RAAF GCI controller cannot adequately cover proposed period of aircraft operations. T/CO 3CARU has discussed relief manning prospects with 101 MCRU, who has nominated FLGOFF SNOW as qualified, current and available. Request OCAMB concurrence and HQOC action to attach SNOW to 3CRU for duty AACC Mascot wef PM hours 02 JUL83. SNOW to report to SQNLDR NIBBLET.

4. Reports will be forwarded as directed Ref B.

PAGE NO	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE	PHONE NO	REF FILE NO
1	W.D.J MONAGHAN OC WLM	6000	

NO OF PAGES	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	DATE
2	SGT R.F. LOWERY		01 JUL 82

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

942

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED

7

NNNVZCZCOHA422 HH

RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 869 183Ø4Ø3

ZNY RRRRR

P Ø2Ø341Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

725/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, AMB, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

REF A. HQWLM ØØ1/DO Ø2Ø139Z. SITREP NO 1.

B. HQOC 673/SOINT 3ØJUN83

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STAFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-Ø3Ø AND FADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY RADAR COVERAGE 15Ø-165 NM

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEY RADIALS

RECEIVED 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

'83 JUL -2 -4 54

RAAF COMMCEN

RESTRICTED

C. WHILE SOME TRACKS ARE HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS VERY STRONG PAINTS THE MAJORITY ARE WEAK

D. PERIOD OF SIGHTINGS ARE REPORTED TO RANGE FROM BETWEEN ONE TO EIGHT SWEEPS AT FIVE RPM. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONS EXTENDING TO 14 SWEEPS ASSUMING SAME TRACK

D. PLOTS OF REPORTED TRACKS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH ANY KNOWN FLIGHT PROFILES OF ANY MAN MADE OBJECT NOR ARE OBSERVATIONS CONSISTENT WITH ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

E. MAJORITY OF THE REPORTED SIGHTINGS HAVE BEEN IN LOCATIONS WITHIN ROUND MOUNTAIN, WLM SURAD AND 3CRU RADAR COVERAGE. DOFA AND RAAF ATC STAFF CONFIRM THAT NO TRACKS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY ROUND MOUNTAIN SINCE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS WERE FIRST OBSERVED. WLM STAFF ALSO CONFIRM THEY ALSO HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SPECIFIC TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY AS UNIDENTIFIED OR ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OF UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS ON WLM RADAR. REF B INDICATED THAT ONE TRACK HAD BEEN CORROBORATED BY 3CRU. FURTHER INQUIRIES REVEAL THAT THIS RESULTED FROM A RATHER CASUAL INQUIRY FROM SYDNEY RELATING TO AN OBSERVED TRACK ABOUT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS. WHILE NOT DETRACTING FROM THE ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT IT DOES RAISE EXTREME DOUBTS ON WHETHER THIS UNRECORDED INTERCHANGE COULD

B. REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONTINUING

BT

IMMEDIATE

6

'83 JUL -1 -4 :55

RAAF
COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA223 UU

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 422 1820407

ZNR UUUUU

O 010350Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG ADA

387/COFS

FOR OC FROM COFS

SURVEILLANCE TASKING

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY

BT

RECEIVED
- 4 JUL 1983
HQWLM

IMMEDIATE

82Ø.

NNVZCZCOHA228 UU

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 423 182Ø416

ZNR UUUUU

O Ø1Ø4Ø2Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRCX/AVAIT NSW AA261Ø

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG HOQ

397/SOCC

AVAIT FOR MR BOB POWELL (SSATC)

POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS WITHIN 15Ø NM RADIUS OF WILLIAMTOWN

A. TELCOM WGCDR V. MEYN/BOB POWELL.

1. TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE SCRAMBLE OF MIRAGE AIRCRAFT FROM WILLIAMTOWN, TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS, REQUEST ASSURANCE THAT EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY SYDNEY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, TO PERMIT UNINTERUPTED SCRAMBLE VECTORS AS REQUESTED BY WILLIAMTOWN.

2. THE DURATION OF THIS REQUEST IS UNKNOWN, AND APPLICATION OF OF THIS ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED UNTIL OTHERWISE ADVISED BY HQ WILLIAMTOWN

'83 JUL -1 -5 :27

RAAF COMMCEN

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

PAGE 2 RAYROB 423 UNCLAS

3. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE TO THIS HQ AND HQWLM

BT

831

4

RESTRICTED

'83 JUL -1 -5 :58

RAAF COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA236 HH

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYWPA Ø63 182Ø514

ZNY RRRRR

O R Ø1Ø514Z JUL 83 ZZM1

This message is a correction. Destroy other copies.

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

A0917/DGOPS-AF

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPSAF/COFS OF 3Ø JUN 83

B. HQOC Ø73/SOINT OF 3ØØ35ØZ JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS ARE AT DISCRETION OF AOCOC, HOWEVER THE PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST OF THE TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE TO BE COVERED.

4. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED ON VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT, REPEAT, NOT TO CARRY WEAPONS.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO DEFAIR (DOPS-AF) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CURRENT AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS.

B. ANY FURTHER DETECTIONS OF SIMILAR TRACKS AND DETAILS OF ANY RESPONISVE ACTION ARE TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

C. A SITREP IS TO BE FORWARDED DAILY TO COVER THE SITUATION TO 1ØØØ HOURS LOCAL. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS, ADVICE ON ANY PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF THE TRACKS AND ANY HQOC RECOMMENDATIONS.

D. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE CONSLUSION OF THE OPERATION.

6. AT THIS STAGE IT IS PLANNED THAT AIRCRAFT STANDBY BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF ALL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS

BT

IMMEDIATE 867.

RESTRICTED

3/

'83 JUL -1 -8 :17

RAAF COMMCEN

NNNNVZCZCOHA280 HH

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 430 1820741

ZNY RRRRR

O 010735Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

723/AOC

FOR OCAMB, OCWLM DEFAIR FOR DGOPS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILIAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYD AREA.

2. OCWLM HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO IDENTIFY THESE TRACKS. TO SUPPORT OCWLM AS NECESSARY YOU ARE TO DEPLOY TWO CLEAN F111S TO WLM ASAP. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE ASSETS IS TO REVERT TO OCWLM ON ARRIVAL WLM.

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

3. AT THIS STAGE, THESE AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE OPERATED ON AN AIRCREW TURNAROUND BASIS UNTIL TUES 5 JUL 83, WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM HQWLM UNITS. UP TO TWO MISSIONS PER DAY SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED. FURTHER AIRCREW/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT EX AMBERLEY MAY BE REQUIRED AFTER MON 4 JUL 83. DIRLAUTH OCWLM/OCAMB IS AUTHORIZED IN THIS REGARD.

4. SEPERATE INSTRUCTIONS/GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF F111 ASSETS IN THIS OPERATION WILL BE ISSUED TO OCWLM INFO OCAMB

BT

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

2

NNNNVZCZCOHA293 HH

'83 JUL -1 -8 :39

RAAF COMMCEN

00 RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 431 1820803

ZNY RRRRR

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 HQWLM

O 010755Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

724/AOC

FOR OCWLM, OCAMB DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 1 JUL 83

B. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

1. FURTHER TO INSTRUCTIONS AT REFERENCE A AND CONSIDERING THE REQUIREMENTS OF REFERENCE B, AIRCRAFT MAY BE SCRAMBLED, AT YOUR DISCRETION, FOR IDENTIFICATION OF TRACKS DETECTED ONLY BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. AIRCRAFT AND CARU ALERT STATES ARE AT YOUR DISCRETION, HOWEVER, YOU ARE TO ENSURE THAT TIME PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED.

RESTRICTED

3. TWO F-111 AIRCRAFT ARE BEING DEPLOYED TO WLM FOR YOUR USE DURING THIS OPERATION AND ARE PLACED UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL FROM TIME OF ARRIVAL WLM.

4. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS OPERATION THE RESTRICTIONS REGARDING SUPERSONIC FLIGHT AS DETAILED IN HQOC ASI 1/A/4 ARE WAIVED. HOWEVER, F-111 AIRCRAFT SHOULD AVOID SUPERSONIC FLIGHT OVER LAND UNLESS IT BECOMES ESSENTIAL FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IDENTIFICATION OF A TARGET.

5. ONE AIR DEFENCE CONTROLLER HAS BEEN ATTACHED FROM 3 CARU FOR DUTY MASCOT. ON HIS ARRIVAL AT MASCOT CLOSE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE EFFECTED, AT YOUR DISCRETION, BY EITHER 3 CARU OR SYDNEY RADAR.

6. SPECIAL AIRWAYS CLEARANCE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGREED WITH DOA SYDNEY AND DETAILS HAVE BEEN ADVISED SEPARATELY.

7. YOU ARE TO REPORT DIRECT TO THIS HQ COPY TO DEFAIR (DGOPS) AS REQUIRED BY PARA 5 OF REFERENCE B. DETAILS OF SCRAMBLES AND ADVICE OF ANY MULTI SENSOR CORRELATED TRACKS SHOULD BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY. THE DAILY SITREP SHOULD INCLUDE DETAILS OF ALL UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS REPORTED TO 3 CARU

BT

Copy 31 of 45

Telephone 28.7777

Headquarters
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

HQWLM 17/26/AIR
HQWLM 7/4/AIR(2)

1 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown Operation Order No 11/83 - Exercise Close Encounter

Reference: A. Telecon COFS/OCWLM of approximately 300930ZJUN83

Time Zone Used Throughout This Order: ZULU

Task Organization: No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 77 Squadron
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
No 481 Squadron
Base SQuadron RAAF Williamtown

1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.

a. Energy Forces NIL

b. Friendly Forces NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.

a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.

b. Provision of Forces.

(1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.

(2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77SQN pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.

(3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.

(4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.

(5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77SQN or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.

3. Execution

a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DofA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.

b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.

c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.

d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1, and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.

e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCWLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.

f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENGO is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.

b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.

c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:

(1) ATC Van. The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.

(2) Refuelling Tankers. 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.

(3) Messing. All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.

(4) Central Store. Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.

5. Command and Signal

a. IFF/SIF. Routine 20CU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.

6. Acknowledgement Instructions. Do not acknowledge.

(W.D.J. MONAGHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

Distribution:	Copy Nos:
Headquarters RAAF Williamtown	1- 5
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown	6-10
No 77 Squadron	11-15
No 481 Squadron	16-21
No 2 Operational Conversion Unit	22-24
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit	25-28
Unit History	29-30
HQWLM File 7/4/Air	31
HQWLM File ~~16/27/Air~~ 17/26/AIR	32
Spares	34-40

External:

Headquarters Operational Command	33